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Amid the renewed exchange of attacks between Israel and Lebanon, the US-Iran negotiations, originally scheduled to take place in Switzerland on June 19, were postponed until June 21. However, a similar round of talks was held before the United States launched its large-scale military strikes against Iran in late February. Those negotiations ultimately collapsed, paving the way for the subsequent US-Iran conflict.
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Now that neither side has secured a decisive victory on the battlefield, the question is whether this latest round of negotiations can realistically produce any meaningful outcome.
In reality, the negotiations between Washington and Tehran extend beyond bilateral issues and also encompass the Israel-Lebanon conflict. Yet Israel itself is not participating in the talks, making it inherently difficult for any agreement to succeed.
Israel is expected to hold a general election before October, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approval rating has fallen below 50 percent, largely because many Israelis believe he has been overly accommodating to the US in dealing with Iran. If Netanyahu hopes to secure another term, he is unlikely to make concessions on either Lebanon or Iran. Conversely, if he loses power, his successor is likely to adopt an even more hard-line stance toward Iran.
This alone significantly reduces the likelihood of a consensus emerging from the US-Iran negotiations. Even if Washington were to promise Tehran that the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon would continue, there is no guarantee that Israel would honor such an arrangement.
The current situation illustrates this point clearly: despite the US and Iran signing a memorandum of understanding, hostilities between Israel and Lebanon have continued unabated, prompting Iran once again to threaten the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. As long as Israel does not endorse any agreement, any consensus reached between Washington and Tehran will remain extremely difficult to implement in practice.
Moreover, significant opposition to reconciliation exists within both countries. In the US, many Republican hawks have criticized President Donald Trump for making excessive concessions to Iran, arguing that Washington’s commitment to provide reconstruction funding demonstrates weakness rather than strength.
At the same time, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has publicly stated that he does not support the current US-Iran MoU. According to his statement, the agreement was accepted only because Tehran’s leadership believed it could maximize Iran’s national interests in negotiations with Washington. This suggests that unless the US agrees to unfreeze Iran’s overseas assets and lift the majority of its sanctions, Khamenei is unlikely to endorse any final agreement. The key question, therefore, is whether the Trump administration would ever be willing to accept such terms.
For these reasons, investors should avoid placing excessive optimism on the prospects of the US-Iran negotiations. Likewise, a full restoration of commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to its pre-war level remains a highly challenging prospect.
Andrew Wong is a veteran independent commentator
