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Donald Tsang's first question-and-answer session
with Legco last week signals trouble ahead. His predecessor managed during most
of his reign to pit the so-called patriotic majority against pan-democrats.
Three times a year, he put up with no more than about 30 minutes of democrats
pestering and the rest of the time bantering with allies. Then back to the
office for months of peace.
Those were the days when it was great to be chief executive.
Under Tung, Legco Q&A sessions gyrated wildly from the many patriots'
fawning compliments and respectful pleas to the few democrats' frustrated
criticisms and demands. But after the July 2003 march, the Liberals' Article 23
desertion, the DAB's 2003 District Council election massacre and the democrats'
gain of seats in September 2004, despite every effort by every asset Beijing
could muster, all but dyed-in-the-wool sycophants began to nip the hand that
fed them.
With Tsang, even sycophants snap and snarl.
He was warned, chided, described as arrogant and labeled all but a liar by those
columnist Steve Vines describes as Beijing's lapdogs. The formerly sycophantic
bodies of James Tien and Choy So-yuk and several other ``patriots'' seemed
veritably possessed by the querulous demons of democrats Albert Cheng and Emily
Lau.
What happens when lapdogs turn rabid? Go to Legco's Web site and see for
yourself.
Some expect Tsang's relations with the former lapdog faction to magically
improve after July 10 when the mantle of Beijing's blessing descends upon his
anointed shoulders. Beijing appears to believe that what Legco in particular
and Hong Kong in general need is a stiff dose of determined leadership.
They want Donald to snap the whip and get all the dogs pulling in the same
direction. But will left-wing poodles obey Sir Donald, ex-colonial?
Like Back to the Future, Beijing supposes getting Hong Kong's future in
hand requires returning colonial civil servants to command. They expect Tsang
to restore mythic days of colonial executive-led government, when all but a few
were politically apathetic and all arms of government conspired to maintain
Britain's control.
But like fiction-writer Garrison Keillor's Lake Wobegon, ``where all the women
are strong, the men good-looking, and all the children above average,'' there
never was such a place. Lam Wai-man's Understanding the Political Culture of
Hong Kong decisively proves colonial Hong Kongers' political apathy
always was a myth.
Colonial officials drove politics underground with the Special Branch where and
when they could, co-opted critics if possible, bribed any and all with
monopolies, subsidies, and honors and at last resort, jailed or expelled
hardcore opponents. When even that began to fail in the 1960s, they developed
an elaborate consultation system. They appointed thousands to chair and serve
on boards and committees, collect fat honorariums, and have a chance to climb
the ladder of collaboration right up to Exco. The colonials hired thousands as
civil servants with the understanding they would back the government and
frankly warn the colonials when they felt it needed.
Mutual Aid Societies extended government's ear down to the individual public
housing block. When even this control system proved insufficient, the British
developed district boards with universal suffrage elections, reformed the urban
and regional councils, and began functional, then direct, elections to Legco.
When Hong Kong was a place of relative freedom and real prosperity all but
isolated from a poverty-stricken, violence-wracked, lawless mainland, most
chose collaboration with colonials over expulsion to the mainland or emigration
overseas. Despite threats, a vigorous civil society pressed for many changes
from the 1950s to the 80s. Today, with nearly half the population well educated
and having relatives abroad with right of abode and with Guang-dong nearly as
prosperous and modern in many aspects while far cheaper, expulsion no longer
works to coerce cooperation.
Hong Kongers' rising ability to pressure government forced change. The
functional constituency system formally recognized the power and involvement of
thousands of individuals and groups in politics.
Colonial control mechanisms are dead. Even the pious Sir Donald cannot
miraculously resurrect them. Back to the future is not an option.
Beijing should remember the pioneers of the Chinese Communist Party on May 4,
1919 who determined China needed democracy and science to secure its future.
They have nurtured science well, but as Kuomintang leader Lien Chan pointed
out, not democracy.
Science may bring prosperity, but democracy secures it. Forward to democracy,
not backward to colon-ialism, is Hong Kong's and China's solution then, and
now.
degolyer@hkbu.edu.hk
Michael DeGolyer is an associate professor of the government and
international studies department at Hong Kong Baptist University
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