Surrounded by hostile and semi-hostile states, Lebanon stands alone as part of a Syrian sphere of influence. In important respects, Lebanon is the mortar holding together the bricks of a weak regime.

Over the course of three decades, Syria has transformed Lebanon into a vassal state that lacks any true independence - Syria doesn't even recognize Lebanese passports or maintain an embassy in Beirut. The Syrian Baathists have long considered Lebanon an integral part of their concept of Bilad al-Sham, or ``Greater Syria'', a territorial abstraction that also lays claim to Israel, Jordan and parts of Turkey. It is a construct that carries substantial ideological currency and losing its position in Lebanon would only serve to bring Damascus' regional ambitions to an ignominious end. This explains its flurry of diplomatic activity to help place a pan-Arab patina on any withdrawal agreement.

In addition, Syria may face harsh economic realities if forced to quit Lebanon. Perhaps 20 percent or more of the Syrian economy is based on Lebanese sources of revenue. Up to a million Syrians work in Lebanon, where they earn respectable wages, much of which is remitted to Syria. Commissions on business deals and extensive corruption also benefit the well-heeled in Syria. Syrian interests control much of the country's resources and Syrian domination of the robust Bekaa Valley drug trade also provides significant streams of revenue. Losing its economic suzerainty over Lebanon could cripple an already teetering Syrian economy.

Most important, however, a pliant Lebanon provides Syria strategic depth along its western frontier, a crucial buffer Damascus has relied on to check its Israeli adversary.

Quite simply, Lebanon is Damascus' strongest negotiating card with Israel. Losing Lebanon, in the full sense of the word, would represent a significant attenuation of Syria's deterrent posture with Israel - and, if that is lost, a diminution of leverage over the Palestinian issue may not be far behind.

Damascus will not relinquish that easily, and removing 14,000 troops from Lebanon is not especially important from a strategic standpoint.

Damascus is not without arrows in its quiver. It has extended its tentacles deeply into Lebanese society, effectively controlling its political, economic and military/intelligence apparatus. Its intelligence services, which are deeply entrenched within Lebanon, are of far greater importance. Their cheek-by-jowl relationship with Lebanese intelligence and thousands of local informants ensure that a pro forma closing of their main office will not end Syrian influence. They still wield the ability to shape political developments and destabilize Lebanon by unleashing massive civil strife.

In addition, Damascus still maintains great influence over Hezbollah, which one former senior US Federal Bureau of Investigation official described as ``the best light infantry in the world.'' Syrian patronage of Hezbollah is well known and its logic rather simple. Its 25,000-man force, armed with 10,000 rockets and missiles, is a strategic asset that Syria has used as leverage in its conflict with Israel, especially with respect to the Golan Heights. Damascus has jealously guarded Hezbollah's position in Lebanon and disarmed all of its rivals.

In the face of a Syrian withdrawal, Hezbollah and other Lebanese concerns that have benefited from Syrian patronage may very well resort to violence to protect their interests. Hezbollah may choose to foment strife, conveying the all too clear message that there will be no stability in Lebanon without Syria's steadying hand. Recent bombings in Christian suburbs of Beirut may provide a foretaste of what lies ahead.

This could potentially lead to widespread unrest, even civil war, which would have major ramifications in Israel, Syria and beyond.

Some Israeli officials believe that Hezbollah has recently reinvigorated attempts to subcontract attacks in Israel by Palestinian militant groups. A Lebanese civil war may in fact rebound to Hezbollah's favor, as a Syrian withdrawal would leave Hezbollah the most powerful force in Lebanon - more powerful than the Lebanese army. A Hezbollah victory in such a conflict would fulfill Shiite aspirations of controlling the country and create nightmares in neighboring countries with potentially restive Shiite populations, Saudi Arabia not least among them. Such a development would create a Shiite axis stretching from Iran, through Iraq to Lebanon, delighting Teheran.

For these reasons, Israel, especially, may have reservations about a full Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and would want the Lebanese army to assume quick control of the southern parts of the country. Jerusalem is divided between those who prefer the overall stability that Hezbollah's Syrian overlords can provide and those who believe a Syrian withdrawal will undermine Hezbollah's power fundamentally. The known devil may be preferable to the unknown one, as far as some in Jerusalem are concerned.

Syrian patronage of Hezbollah has allowed Damascus to call the proverbial shots - Syria unleashed Hezbollah when it suited its interests, like in Shebaa Farms, and reined it in when it feared provoking Israel. This was especially the case with the elder Assad, who exercised far greater control over Hezbollah. As such, Damascus provided Israel a calling card if Hezbollah attacked Israeli interests and Damascus realized that it would be held to account for the group's activities. ``We have an address,'' many Israeli policymakers would warn. With that moderating influence removed, will Hezbollah pull off its proverbial gloves and try to draw Israel into a conflict?

Hezbollah's relative popularity in Lebanon stems from its defiant opposition to the Israeli occupation. By provoking Israel into a conflict, it may hope to play its strongest card and rally popular support at the expense of its political opposition.

Without a common Israeli enemy, Hezbollah's appeal as a purely political entity diminishes. Jerusalem has remained decidedly hushed so far, partly at Washington's behest, so as not to provide rhetorical ammunition to Damascus or Hezbollah. However, even if Syria withdraws fully from Lebanon and its influence wanes, the country still may not be freed from foreign influence.

Power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. With its Syrian ally in disarray, Teheran will attempt to fill the void left behind by Syria's putative departure from Lebanon.

According to some sources, Iran has been fortifying Hezbollah bases in the face of a Syrian troop withdrawal in an attempt to enhance its strategic position. Iran has been using Revolutionary Guard units to fortify important positions Syria has promised to vacate, such as early warning stations.

Iran maintains about 1,000 Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon, serving as ideological and military advisers to Hezbollah.

Teheran is also reportedly increasing arms shipments to Hezbollah, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles, one of which unnerved the Israeli air force by recently penetrating Israeli airspace undetected. It is also using the organization to create a larger pro-Iranian Shiite force in Lebanon. Teheran thus wields the ability to ignite a larger Middle Eastern conflict.

According to a spokesman for the Druze opposition, ``Iran sees the mounting pressure on its partner Syria to withdraw and is using it as an opportunity to become the next power broker in Lebanon.'' By fortifying its Hezbollah proxy in Lebanon, Teheran sends a resounding signal that Israel cannot disregard Iranian interests without suffering harsh consequences. More pointedly, it serves as a visible and powerful deterrent against any attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Damascus is notoriously adept at finding windows of opportunity to outmaneuver opponents. It will temporize and make tactical concessions in the short run in the hope that it will reassert its influence when the glare of scrutiny is removed. It will hope to outlast Washington and its allies, attempting to exploit fissures in their positions. It will not surrender control of Lebanon quietly.

Brian Maher is an analyst with the Power and Interest News Report. He has a Master's Degree in Defense and Strategic Studies from Southwest Missouri State University.