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On a chilly morning last December, Zhu Dingya
huddled with other merchants outside the Silk Alley market in Beijing, one of
the city's most prominent attractions, and inspected a notice tacked to the
entrance. His fears were confirmed - the local government was tearing the place
down.
Zhu seethed at what was not printed. The notice said the stalls were a fire
hazard. It did not say that the glass-fronted building next door would house a
new Silk Alley market, with much higher rents collected by a profit-making
venture whose original shareholders included local Communist Party officials.
It did not say that the developers of the new building obtained the land from
the government at a steep discount.
For more than two decades, as communism gave way to an increasingly freewheeling
capitalism in China, Zhu sold clothing in the popular open-air market a few
blocks from Tiananmen Square. His trade was an archetype of the entrepreneurial
spirit the nation's reforms were supposed to encourage. He had left his state
construction job and his government pension to earn his own living.
Now, he was out of business, not by dint of the free market, but by an unchanged
feature of China's past - by party leaders who retain control over land and
capital, and often use it for personal gain.
``It's totally unfair,'' Zhu said. ``We previously believed the government
wanted to help us. We've all been betrayed by these officials.''
From farmers selling vegetables in every town to sales agents touting penthouses
in neon-lit urban landscapes, free enterprise has penetrated Chinese life. But
the closing of the Silk Alley market, one of the early experiments in
modern-day capitalism, shows how winners and losers are still often determined
not by supply and demand but by the dictates of party officials.
``It's quite typical,''Capital University of Economics and Business economist
Jiang Zezhong said in Beijing. ``The government has the power and investors
have the money. They join up and together extract all the benefits.''
Over the years, Zhu expanded into clothing and Silk Alley burgeoned into a
Beijing landmark, a teeming assemblage of 400 stalls that was a must-see on
every tourist itinerary. Locals bought winter coats and luggage, many of which
were counterfeit versions of leading brands. Foreigners snapped up trinkets and
silk garments, while changing US dollars on the black market. In more recent
years, Silk Alley did a brisk trade in pirated Hollywood movies.
By the mid-1990s, Zhu was bringing home as much as US$600 (HK$4,680) a month. He
bought a television set in 1989 and a telephone two years later. He added an
air-conditioner and a Volkswagen sedan in 1995. In 1998, he moved into an
apartment with a private kitchen and flush toilet.
By then, the Beijing government was talking openly about shutting down the
city's open-air markets. China's capital was in the midst of a modernization
drive. Butchered pigs hanging from hooks and touts hollering prices were not in
keeping with the sleek new image. As Western governments pressured Beijing to
crack down on counterfeit goods, open-air markets were obvious targets.
The local government began closing some of them in 1998. Officials told Silk
Alley merchants to prepare to go elsewhere. But economists staged conferences
and wrote opinion pieces criticizing the plan as unfair to merchants. Silk
Alley lived on.
``These people live on their sales,'' Jiang said. ``If you close the market, you
have killed their jobs.''
But the pressure remained, in part because Silk Alley was on prime real estate
in the center of the city and developers lobbied the government to clear it.
In October 2002, Jiang saw a document declaring that the Chaoyang district
government had submitted an application to the Beijing Municipal Commission of
Urban Planning seeking permission to replace the market with a new building.
``In China, if there's a formal document, that means it's already a done deal,''
he said.
The first public sign came on July 29, 2003, with a notice tacked outside Silk
Alley. A developer named Xinya announced it would soon tear down adjacent
houses, while leaving it unclear whether its work would affect the market.
Zhu and several other merchants went to the Chaoyang district to inquire. They
were told the project had nothing to do with the government, Zhu said.
But local officials were intimately connected to the project and would soon take
an indirect stake in it, according to documents seen by The Washington Post.
In June, 2004, a company was created to manage the Silk Alley market. According
to the registration filed with the municipal government, the new company had
two shareholders - the developer, Xinya Shuntianfu Commercial Franchise Corp,
and a real estate firm, Tianwei Lida Commercial and Trade Corp. At the time,
Tianwei's shareholders included 15 officials of the Jianguomenwai subdistrict,
among them party secretary Guo Liwen. She was also listed as the new management
company's general manager. Guo and the other officials did not respond to
repeated requests for comment.
The new firm, Beijing Xiushui Haoseng Garment Market Co, received fees merchants
had previously paid to the local government, Xinya president Zhang Yongping
said. The old fees had been paid by about 400 merchants and ran to about US$500
a month. Once the new four-story building opens in mid-March, about 1,500
merchants will each pay about US$1,500 a month. Zhang justified the increases
by noting the new building is heated and air-conditioned. As the work on the
new building began in the fall of 2003, the merchants repeatedly went to see
the developer and the local officials. Each time, they were told the new
structure had no connection to Silk Alley, Zhu said.
``We figured it was nonsense,'' he said. Zhu and several other merchants hired a
lawyer to look into the development. Last spring, he came across documents
showing the creation of Haoseng and its links to local officials.
In July 2004, the merchants met local officials in a hotel conference room to
discuss the future of the market. One of the officials listed as a Tianwei
shareholder attended the meeting, arriving in his black Mercedes, Zhu said.
The local officials confirmed the market's future was uncertain, but said no
plans had been made to close it. They repeated that the new building next door
had no connection to Silk Alley and insisted local officials had renounced all
financial interests.
But while the officials did later transfer their shares in Tianwei to a woman
named Zhang Donghong, that did not occur until more than three months later, on
November 18, 2004, according to a document filed with the local government.
Two weeks after the meeting, Zhu read in the China Youth Daily newspaper
that the developer, Xinya, had purchased land rights for the new building for
US$6.2 million, less than one-third the price of a similar site in the area.
Zhang confirmed the purchase price but rejected suggestions it was improper.
He said the discount was justified by his company's expensive investment in the
creation of an amenity for the city. ``We acquired this land according to the
law,'' he said.
On the morning of December 20, 2004, four police cars pulled up to Silk Alley
carrying more than a dozen officers and a subdistrict government official who
affixed the notice - the market would be demolished.
``If you do not leave by yourself, our agency will force you out according to
the law,'' the notice warned. ``Anyone who interferes with our action will be
punished.'' It was signed by the Chaoyang District City Regulatory and
Supervision Unit.
On January 6, the bulldozers came and tore down the stalls.
These days, Zhu and the other merchants are trying to find new places to sell
their merchandise, while pursuing legal options for compensation - a prospect
for which their lawyer, Chen Xiaobing, is not optimistic.
``The merchants are weak,'' Chen said. ``The government is too strong.''
THE WASHINGTON POST
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